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The objective of this paper is to identify the policy implications of the findings of the 
comparative project on tsunami rehabilitation carried out in Sri Lanka and Aceh. It begins 
with a critique of the notion of ‘emergency’ that dominates humanitarian organisations. It 
also shows how managerial tools like Guiding Principles are no answer to the complex issues 
faced by projects.  The last section points to a number of issues raised by the research studies: 
the importance of constantly questioning the theoretical and methodological models used by 
humanitarian aid organizations; the need for a better understanding of the nature of the state 
and its possible role in rehabilitation; the tragic consequences which result when social 
organization and land tenure patterns are ignored by aid organizations; that the repetition of 
the mantra of community participation does not ensure equity. It concludes with the argument 
that for policies and projects to be successful, implementors have to make use of the existing 
knowledge base and must employ people who have the competence and experience to work 
in these societies; the institutional structures of the agencies must also be flexible to deal with 
all kinds of social and political complexities which are unique to each country. 
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The research project on which this special issue of Domains is based, ‘Post-tsunami 
reconstruction in contexts of war – a grassroots study of the geo-politics of humanitarian aid 
in Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka and Aceh, Indonesia,’ departed from the approach that 
dominated much of other studies on tsunami rehabilitation, in important ways. Firstly, it 
avoided the period of heightened interest in the tsunami, from 2005-2006, and sought to focus 
on longer term repercussions of rehabilitation. Secondly, it was based on eight, long-term 
field-level studies carried out in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. Both these factors created the 
possibility of a more in-depth look at the relationship between tsunami rehabilitation and the 
society that was at the receiving end of this aid. 
 
This project, like many of the other studies carried out on tsunami rehabilitation was also 
interested in influencing policy debates. However, it adopted a novel strategy to achieve this 
objective. It sought to separate the research phase from that of generating ideas on policy 
implications. In other words, the researchers were given the space to carry out their tasks 
without being forced to come out with policy recommendations, at the end of their research. 
Most importantly, field studies were not policy driven but rather, each research study was 
built out of prior research knowledge and experience of the affected regions in which they 
were conducted, by researchers who had a long and committed scholarly and/or activist 
involvement in those regions. This strategy was adopted consciously because of the 
realisation that having policy compulsions right from the beginning might not only be a 
barrier to good research, but also would not produce good policy recommendations. This has 
often been the experience of research projects, unless they fall into the category of policy 
research. In the latter case, policy questions drive the research and policy recommendations 
are the primary objective of the research. My task in this project was to facilitate discussions 
about the intersections between research and policy and to tease out policy questions arising 
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from the research, in conjunction with the researchers as well as policy makers in both Sri 
Lanka and Aceh. 
 
The objective of this paper is to present the key policy questions that arise from the findings 
of the case studies of the project. As mentioned above, this is a comparative research project 
covering a number of locations in Sri Lanka and Aceh province in Indonesia. However, in 
raising issues for policy debates, the focus of this paper is Sri Lanka. This does not mean the 
paper has ignored the findings of the Aceh component. The experiences in Aceh have been 
brought in for comparative purposes wherever relevant. Sometimes the Aceh findings are 
used to raise policy issues for Sri Lanka. It is hoped this strategy, while primarily focusing on 
Sri Lanka, will make some contribution to policy debates in Aceh as well.     
 
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. The paper begins with a brief discussion 
on the links between research and policy. The main purpose is to clarify how this paper has 
approached this subject. The second section is an overall critique of the approach adopted by 
the bulk of tsunami rehabilitation projects in Sri Lanka. It covers a central policy instrument – 
Guiding Principles – which dominated the discussions within aid agencies. This is followed 
by the final section which focuses on some specific policy issues arising from research.  
 
Links between Research and Policy-Making 
 
Understanding the nature of the links between research and policy is an interesting area of 
work. There has been very little effort in Sri Lanka to explore how this process works. By 
and large the discussion centres on a blame game. When policy makers do not take notice of 
research findings, the usual reaction of the researchers is to blame the politicians or the 
 5 
bureaucrats for not having the capacity to understand the research findings, or for ignoring 
them because of other reasons like partisan political interests. The policy makers usually 
argue that some of the research is irrelevant and does not generate knowledge necessary for 
policy making. In the case of politically contentious issues, researchers and policy makers 
often find themselves on opposing sides. Policy makers also find little time or inclination to 
digest research findings.  
 
Those who have shown an interest in the issue conceptualise the link between research and 
policy as a linear process in which ‘a set of research findings is shifted from the ‘research 
sphere’ over to the ‘policy sphere’, and then has some impact on policy-makers’ decisions’.1 
This linear model is based on several assumptions: “First, the assumption that research 
influences policy in a one-way process (the linear model); second the assumption that there is 
a clear divide between researchers and policy makers (the two communities model); and 
third, the assumption that production of knowledge is confined to a set of specific findings 
(the positivist model).”2
 
       
The linear view of the links between research and policy has given rise to many activities. A 
dominant one is to focus on various means of communication. The question of links between 
research and policy has been reduced to one of communication and various strategies that are 
adopted to communicate the findings to the relevant policy makers.  
 
Links between research and policy is much more chaotic and messy than implied by this 
model. The complexity of these links creates many entry points and strategies to influence 
policy. For example, research institutes influence policy through monitoring exercises, 
                                                 
1 Overseas Development Institute, Research and Policy in Development, “The RAPID Framework,” accessed at 
http://www.odi.org.uk/Rapid/Tools/Toolkits/RAPID_Framework.html.  
2 Ibid.  
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judicial activism, campaigning, lobbying, etc., in addition to more traditional publications and 
disseminations. Some of these strategies need not be directed only at policy makers. It can 
focus on the media with the objective of creating public opinion. Research itself can have 
number of objectives. Sometimes it can simply provide more in-depth information to 
policymakers. Or it can provide specific recommendations on the implementation process or 
make recommendations for reforms to the organisation implementing specific projects. 
Finally, research can question some of the fundamental concepts that underlie policies. 
 
The exercise undertaken in this project belongs to the last category. Every project undertaken 
by aid agencies, or implementers funded by aid agencies, operates on the basis of a set of 
fundamental ideas. These ideas reflect a particular conceptualisation of the problem that they 
want to tackle, how these agencies understand the society that they are working in and 
formulation of a set of ideas as the solution. Since these fundamental ideas have been in 
operation for quite some time, they have become elements of a shared discourse within these 
agencies. These ideas find institutional expressions in the way these agencies are organised. 
Often they have become second nature to these organisations and therefore rarely questioned. 
The ICES research project was interested in questioning some of these fundamentals and 
unravelling this shared discourse. Therefore, the goal of this project’s findings was not to 
provide specific guidance for implementing projects on the ground or making policy 
recommendations. Rather, it sought to raise questions about the basic assumptions that 
underlie the conceptualization of projects and policies.        
 
Finally, it is important to note that the policy discussion in this paper is addressed to donors 
and other implementing agencies that depend on donor funding. Therefore, whenever the 
term ‘policy makers’ is used in the text, what is meant is policy makers within aid agencies or 
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in implementing agencies that depend on foreign aid. This narrow focus allows for a more 
meaningful contribution within the limits of this project. In order to be successful, policy 
debates have to keep in mind the specificities of its audience. The manner in which policy 
debates are formulated and acted upon depends very much on the institutional framework 
within which these discussions take place. Each institutional framework sets limits within 
which policy questions are posed and acted upon. Often, it is important to understand the 
structure, logic, language, etc., of specific institutions in order to make useful policy 
recommendations. The methods used to convey messages will also depend on the specificity 
of organisations. For example, if the policy discussion is with the Sri Lankan state the type of 
research that needs to be done, the focus of research and strategies need to be adopted are 
quite different to when the conversation is with an aid agency. Taking these factors into 
account, this project decided to focus on aid agencies and implementing agencies closely 
associated with the former. Therefore this paper is addressed to them.  
 
A Critique of the Overall Approach in Tsunami Rehabilitation 
 
Responses to disasters by aid agencies are based on a particular understanding or an 
interpretation of the phenomenon.3
                                                 
3 See E. L. Quarantelli ed., What is a Disaster (London/New York, Routledge, 1998) for a discussion on 
different theoretical approaches to disasters.  
 The dominant approach is to treat disasters as isolated 
‘events’ rather than a process characterised by the interrelationship between a natural 
phenomenon and society. When a disaster is treated as an event, the focus is on restoring 
what was destroyed (infrastructure, livelihoods, etc.) and doing it as soon as possible. What 
dominates is a discourse of emergency and restoration of the conditions that existed before 
the event. Of course, to do this not only are funds necessary, but they have to be spent as soon 
as possible.  
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In contrast to this there is a set of ideas on how to respond to disasters that has largely been 
initiated by those who came from the field of development. This approach focuses on the 
relationship between the natural phenomenon and society. It is much more interested in the 
links between conditions that existed in society prior to the natural event and disaster. It 
argues that the impact of the disaster is mediated through the structures of society that existed 
prior to disaster, and therefore there is a need to understand these conditions in planning a 
successful disaster management programme.  
 
In this literature, a differentiation is made between ‘hazards’ and ‘disasters’. The term hazard 
is used to identify the natural phenomenon. When hazards mediate through society we have 
disasters. Therefore, the term disaster is reserved for the analysis of the interaction between 
natural phenomena and society. 
 
In responding to disasters, the focus of the latter approach is both emergency restoration and 
long term mitigation. It does not ignore the emergency phase, but argues that even in the 
emergency phase the relationship between the natural phenomenon and society has to be 
taken into account. The fundamental objective is to improve the capacity of society to take 
care of disasters on a long term basis. This will involve many things other than construction. 
 
A society-centred approach to disaster management will reveal that quite a few disasters in 
Sri Lanka are linked to land use and land ownership patterns. Most of the disasters in Sri 
Lanka are floods, droughts and associated phenomena like landslides. Many people who live 
and survive in locations such as low lying areas, non irrigated land and steep hilly areas 
suffer due to disasters. Many of these areas are unsuitable for human habitation. But some 
people are found in these locations due to the land ownership patterns of our society. For 
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many poor people, these areas, unsuitable for living, are the only option they have. In fact, in 
urban areas one can see how market forces have literally pushed the poor people closer to 
water. The greater the demand for land by capital, the more likely it is that those who do not 
have capital will be pushed towards water. Hence, the land use and land ownership patterns 
have a bearing on how a natural disaster mediates through social structures. Land use and 
land ownership is only one, but a very key, aspect for understanding disasters in Sri Lanka. 
This analysis can be expanded bringing in many other dimensions of society that existed prior 
to the moment when the natural phenomenon struck the society. 
 
This focus is essential for understanding the impact of the tsunami as well, although the scale 
of the phenomenon was such that it had an impact on a larger section of society. Quite a lot of 
people who lived near the coastline were affected by the tsunami. But the impact, as well as 
the capacity to recover, depended on the social positions of people. For example, in the case 
of the fishing community, it is the poorer sections of the community who live close to the 
vulnerable locations. They usually fish making use of smaller boats in shallow waters. They 
have suffered significantly and they have difficulty in getting back on their feet. In some 
instances, the inflow of a large number of boats as tsunami assistance has made their 
conditions worse. There are now more fishing boats in shallow waters and lagoons competing 
for limited resources. Those who benefit from the surplus in fishing, such as fish mudalalis, 
or those who own multi-day boats that fish in the deep sea, might not even live right close to 
the sea. Even if they did, they would have had much more permanent and stronger houses 
that would have helped to minimise the effect of the tsunami.  
 
If disasters are viewed in this manner, i.e., focusing on its linkages with societal conditions, 
disaster management gets closely linked with normal development issues. If we take its link 
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to land use and land ownership, disaster management steps can range from resettlement, 
improvements and introducing preventive measures for those who are forced to live in 
difficult areas, various forms of support to improve the coping mechanisms of the people, etc. 
In addition, since anything to do with alienation of land and land settlement in Sri Lanka has 
a direct link with conflict issues, the disaster management strategies have to take into account 
the link between land and conflict as well.  
 
The bulk of what went on in Sri Lanka in the name of tsunami reconstruction was dominated 
by the more traditional ‘event focused’ and ‘emergency mode’ responses. In addition this was 
backed by an unprecedented amount of funds, charity mentality and dominance of a large 
number of international agencies who would be in Sri Lanka only for a short period, and 
would not be there to face some of the problems that this approach might create. In other 
words, issues like long term partners, which are essential for sustainability of development 
projects, did not seem to bother those who came for tsunami rehabilitation. Many of the 
problems in tsunami rehabilitation arose due to the dominance of these fundamental ideas in 
rehabilitation.  
 
Politics of Guiding Principles 
 
Once the relief and rehabilitation got under way the government, donors and                                  
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) agreed to a set of Guiding Principles. These 
Guiding Principles reflected a framework or a set of normative principles which the 
implementers believed would lead to a more desirable outcome of the rehabilitation process. 
In key documents that reviewed the progress of rehabilitation there was always a section 
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which assessed the ground situation in relation to the Guiding Principles. The Guiding 
Principles included some of the following4
 
: 
1. Equity. The allocations of domestic and international donors should be guided by 
the identified needs and local priorities. There should be no discrimination on the 
basis of political, religious, ethnic or gender considerations. The recovery process 
should strengthen the peace process and build confidence. The reconstruction process 
should be sensitive to the impact on neighbouring, but unaffected communities. 
 
2. Subsidiarity. The reconstruction activity should be designed and implemented at 
the lowest competent tier of the government to enable locally appropriate solutions, 
engagement of sub-national structures, capacity building and strengthening the 
different levels of governance and civil society. 
 
3. Consultation. To secure the mid and long term needs of the victims, consultation, 
local decision making and full participation in reconstruction activities is essential. 
Interventions should respect local religion, culture, structures and customs. 
 
4. Communication and transparency. There needs to be adequate communication and 
transparency in decision making and implementation. This refers to policies, 
entitlements and procedures, as well as to resource use. All parties will adopt a policy 
of zero tolerance for corruption. 
 
5. Reduce future vulnerabilities. Reconstruction should reduce future to natural 
hazards by adopting a multi-hazard risk approach. 
 
6. Analysis of individual interventions. Interventions need to be assessed with their 
impact on prospects for peace and conflict, on gender, on the environment and on 
governance and human rights. 
 
7. Debt relief. Revenues resulting from debt relief should demonstrably benefit the 
tsunami victims. 
 
8. Co-ordination. Efforts need to be co-ordinated between all relevant stakeholders.   
 
                                                 
4 Information on these guidelines has been taken from the following three documents: 
Georg Frerks and Bert Klem, “Tsunami Response in Sri Lanka,” Conflict Research Unit, Clingendael 
Institute/Disaster Studies, Wageningen University, March 2005. 
Joint report by the Government of Sri Lanka and Development Partners, “Post Tsunami Recovery and 
Reconstruction, Progress, Challenges, Way Forward” (December 2005); p. vii 
Practical Action (ITDG), “Post-Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction: Compliance with Guiding 
Principles,” Paper presented to the workshop ‘Building back better-Are we on the right track?’ held on 27th 
January 2006. 
There are slight variations in the versions given in each of the documents and thus my summary of some of the 
key ideas is an amalgamation. 
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Many of the documents on the progress of implementation and the general thrust of the 
public debates suggest that there has been little compliance with these Guiding Principles. 
For example, a paper by an NGO presented to a workshop held in January 2006 to assess the 
progress of rehabilitation concluded that: 
 
Over the past year of implementation, there has been no strict monitoring of 
adherence to these principles. Therefore direct evidence of compliance, or its absence, 
is not available. However, there are reliable indications that concerted action has been 
wanting in this respect. The documents listed below contain information that clearly 
points towards poor compliance with Guiding Principles.5
 
   
The paper goes on to cite six key documents that have documented the progress of tsunami 
rehabilitation. 
 
Much of the debate within the aid agencies and implementers revolved around these 
guidelines in one way or another. It dominated the debate and therefore set the terms of the 
discussion. Some NGOs, depending on their interest, elaborated on some aspects of the 




At first glance the Guiding Principles look very positive. They include several ideas that can 
contribute to more desirable outcomes in tsunami rehabilitation. However in order to 
understand what role these Guiding Principles played in the politics of tsunami rehabilitation, 
let us for a moment imagine what really has to happen if these principles were taken seriously 
by those who implemented projects on tsunami rehabilitation. If we take each element of the 
                                                 
5 “Post-Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction: Compliance with Guiding Principles,” op. cit.  
6 See, Transparency International Sri Lanka, Preventing Corruption in Post-Tsunami Relief & Reconstruction 
Operations: Lessons and Implications for Sri Lanka, A briefing note (Colombo: April 2005).  
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Guiding Principles one by one, this would have meant efforts in the following broad 
directions or at least some attempts in these directions: 
 
- Equity – Interventions to undermine structures of power, institutions and practices 
that perpetuate discrimination 
 
- Subsidiarity – Undermining the centralised state led by the President and taking 
action to strengthen sub-district units politically. 
 
- Consultation – Setting up organisations of the victims themselves and involving 
them in planning. 
 
- Communications and Transparency – Ensuring that victims or their organisations 
have the information and can act upon it.   
 
- Reduce future vulnerability – Move way from a focus of restoring to what existed 
before the tsunami, to a long term strategy 
 
- Analysis of the impact on conflict, gender and environment – Once again analysis 
and interventions on structures of power, institutions and practices that sustain the 
conflict, patriarchy and destroy the environment. 
 
- Debt relief – Interventions at the level of the Finance Ministry 
 
- Co-ordination – Sometimes this amounts to only sharing information. But co-
ordination in terms of working on the basis of common plans and objectives demands 
that each agency ignores their own mandate and interest and joins together with 
others.    
 
If the Guiding Principles are viewed in this manner, it is clear what is implied in them is a 
difficult political project. This political project has to tackle the centralised state, structures of 
power in society, organise the victims, ensure that they get information that they can act 
upon, have a long term view of disaster management and reform how aid agencies work. In 
short, it is difficult to expect any of the objectives set out in the Guiding Principles to be 
achieved without a serious political commitment to transforming existing structures of power. 
What happened was far, far away from this political project.  
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Then the question arises as to what does this type of exercise of establishing principles 
actually mean within the politics of the aid industry. The origin of these ideas can be traced 
back to two fields within the aid industry – development and governance. The Guiding 
Principles are a collection of ideas generated from these two fields that contribute towards the 
legitimisation of the activities of aid dependent agencies. They help these agencies to be 
politically correct.  
 
However, the very process of translating these potentially radical ideas into principles, 
depoliticises them. What happens is that a set of ideas which are deeply political, and whose 
fulfilment demands a significant political intervention, get transferred into a set of principles 
which everybody round the table can agree on. In other words, the political content of what 
they mean has been ignored, and the politics of social transformation embedded in these ideas 
are converted into something else. Once these ideas are depoliticised through such exercises, 
instead of political engagement what we have are reports and discussions about compliance. 
This is followed by constant repetition of these slogans without the political content. In the 
end it gives the impression that these agencies are interested in fundamental reforms without 
actually having the political commitment to carry them out. 
 
The pernicious effect of this type of exercise is much wider when these discourses begin to 
dominate the public debate. This is what happened during tsunami rehabilitation. 
Institutionalisation of these discourses, supported through funding, crowded out other types 





Research Findings Relevant for Policy Discussions            
 
The rest of the paper focuses on some of the key findings of research that need to be 
considered by the implementers. In discussing these findings Guiding Principles, which was 
the principle management tool that tried to set a normative framework, will be referred to 
wherever relevant.  
 
Avalanche of Goodwill – How to Manage it? 
 
The tsunami created a global level response from a large number of sources. Probably what 
we saw was a new phenomenon of charity in a globalised world. A variety of transnational 
structures supported by a globalised media helped to bring about this globalised response. 
 
On one hand, this is a reflection of a sense of goodwill. To this extent it had a positive side. 
But on the other side, it also brought in a plethora of agencies and individuals with very 
different worldviews and experiences into the recipient society. Many came without much of 
an understanding of the ground situation. Very soon, they began to face numerous difficulties 
and the blame was on the recipient society. Once they faced challenges due to the nature of 
the society that they were working in the instinct was to blame the victims who were 
ungrateful and had not created the proper conditions so that the funds that were so generously 
given could be utilised.  
 
This contrasts sharply with the attitude of development projects. In development projects, 
there is a recognition that you are working in societies very different to those from where the 
funds originate. This recognition creates the need to understand the recipient society in all its 
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complications. These complications are seen as challenges, and overcoming these difficulties 
is an essential part of development. Therefore, the attitude of a good development practioneer 
is very different from those engaged in emergency humanitarian assistance.   
 
There is no doubt that the massive influx of international organisations and individuals 
created a complex set of problems. Some of these issues are about the perceptions that this 
type of an influx creates in the host society. Others are related to more practical issues of 
effectiveness of interventions, accountability if these interventions go wrong.  
 
The magic word that all donors dealing with this massive influx of aid resorted to was ‘co-
ordination’. This was introduced as part of the Guiding Principles for implementation. But 
this is to reduce a serious political issue about interests of the agencies, how they are 
structured, to the language of management.7
 
 Many of the agencies who undertook tsunami 
reconstruction have their mandates and hierarchical structures that link them to their 
headquarters, usually located in western capitals. Much of their planning goes on within these 
organisational structures. To shift these mandates in such a way so that they can have a 
common programme with a host of other agencies who have their own mandates and 
structures is almost impossible, unless decisions to do so are taken at the highest policy 
making level. Therefore the kind of co-ordination that Sri Lanka needed, which amounted to 
a situation where all actors worked within a framework that would have benefited Sri Lanka, 
was almost impossible to achieve. 
The introduction of a notion of ‘co-ordination’ precluded any type of discussion about the 
internal workings of these organisations. Basically, it is assumed that there is no problem 
                                                 
7 For a very good critique of the notion of coordination in post-tsunami rehabilitation in Sri Lanka, see Jock 
Stirrat, “Competitive Humanitarianism: Relief and the Tsunami in Sri Lanka,” Anthropology Today 22, no. 5 
(2006): 11-16. 
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with them and they need not change. What needs to happen is to ‘co-ordinate’ with other 
agencies, whose mandates also remain intact.       
 
The negative impact of massive external interventions has been an issue that has been raised 
in many other situations - e.g. Rwanda, Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina -  where there were 
significant interventions by external actors. But very little has happened to tackle the negative 
impact caused by the very presence of such a large number of agencies. Tsunami 
rehabilitation in Sri Lanka was one more case in this string of policy failures.  
 
How to Deal with the State?  
 
Findings in both locations – Aceh and Sri Lanka-- where research was carried out, shows the 
importance of understanding the nature of the state and its behaviour in planning 
interventions. Sometimes it is necessary to keep mentioning this issue because in an 
environment of liberal orthodoxy the state is always seen only as a problem. There seems to 
be little effort to understand the nature of the state in societies where donor-supported 
interventions are taking place. This question becomes even more difficult when both the 
character and the behaviour of states varies greatly in different countries. In short, states of 
the global South cannot be understood with a broad brush. In the history of these countries 
there are instances where disasters triggered fundamental structural changes. This possibility 
becomes even more viable in countries where there have been ongoing conflicts. The 
behaviour of the state is determined by many of these considerations. 
 
The initial response of the Sri Lankan state towards tsunami rehabilitation was guided by the 
current orthodoxy of the state sector playing a minimal role of setting the overall framework, 
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while handing over the implementation to private actors. In other words, the Sri Lankan 
government pretty much privatised tsunami rehabilitation. The government set up what was 
called the Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN) which answered directly to the 
President. In keeping with the prevailing ideology, the members of the board of TAFREN 
came from the private sector. The private sector was also brought in to set up the 
implementation mechanisms of TAFREN. The highly centralised state of Sri Lanka, where 
the President enjoys so much power, cleared the way for these decisions. 
 
In this privatisation process of tsunami rehabilitation International Non Governmental 
Organisations (INGOs), along with their local partners, became principle actors. In most 
instances state agencies only played a peripheral role by providing information. When the 
state came back into the picture the language of disaster management dominated,8
 
 although 
many of the activities that constituted rehabilitation were normally carried out by line 
agencies or provincial councils.  
The fact that Sri Lanka depended on external funding played a significant role for this 
particular behaviour of the state. The massive flow of funding had to be co-ordinated by 
centralised institutions. Its usage had to be organised according to the orthodoxy that 
prevailed. Implementation had to be privatised. Finally, since the funds were meant to be for 
recovery from a disaster, state institutions dealing with development was largely kept out. 
Thus, foreign funding was a dominant factor that determined the behaviour of the state.9
 
   
                                                 
8 For an extended discussion on disaster management and disaster risk management, see Vivian Choi, in this 
issue. 
9 A similar experience was had when the Sri Lankan state implemented the Accelerated Mahaweli Development 
Programme. 
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Subsequent developments showed the initial model, which lasted throughout 2005, the first 
year of tsunami rehabilitation, was very much an idea of President Kumaranatunge. As soon 
as the President changed after the December 2005 elections, the attitude towards a less 
interventionist role of the state changed. With the conversion of TAFREN into the 
Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA), under President Rajapaksa, the state 
became more interventionist. However, the interventionist role was most pronounced at the 
central level. The President wanted a greater degree of control at the central level, while what 
happened in the periphery remained almost the same.   
 
The behaviour of the Sri Lankan state had an impact on how the affected population 
perceived the responsiveness of the state. This is borne out by some of the surveys carried out 
among the tsunami survivors with regard to the responsiveness of different actors: 
  
A significant difference between India and Sri Lanka in the tsunami relief effort was 
the role of government. In India, where the government played a critical role in 
coordinating the rescue and relief efforts, the affected families reported satisfaction 
with the visible and tireless district level administration who provided and co-
ordinated relief. In fact the government was ranked as the number one provider by the 
affected people on all dimensions of relief services.10
 
  
The marked absence of state responsibility in the rehabilitation process in the case of Sri 
Lanka can create difficulties in the future. For example, many private actors have been 
responsible for building housing complexes. But who will be responsible for the maintenance 
of common amenities in these complexes in future? There is a long history of INGOs 
implementing various projects and vanishing from the scene, leaving the host country to face 
problems in the future. Usually development projects tackle this issue right from the start by 
undertaking these projects in partnership with local actors, usually the state. Once the project 
                                                 
10 Fritz Institute, Lessons from tsunami: Top Line Findings (Fritz Institute, 2005).  
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ends the partners are responsible for follow up work. Generally those engaged in emergency 
responses do not tackle these issues. The emergency nature of the response helps external 
agencies to ignore this type of problem. What really happened in the case of the tsunami was 
those who came for emergency assistance ended up implementing development projects. To 
complicate matters, the state played a minimal role in implementation. It is quite possible that 
this model will result in many problems in the future without anybody responsible to take 
care of them.  
 
In the case of Aceh, the relationship with the Indonesian state was mediated by the conflict 
that prevailed. Before the tsunami, Aceh was a highly militarised province. The Indonesian 
state viewed this area primarily through the lens of tackling an insurgency through military 
means and maintaining the coherence of the Indonesian state. The tsunami and the peace 
process that followed forced the Indonesian state to rethink this behaviour. The Indonesian 
state responded positively to the demand for autonomy, but at the same time began to take 
measures that would maintain the cohesiveness of the Indonesian state. 
 
The important policy issue that needs to be noted here is that a state’s behaviour is extremely 
complex and often determined by internal political compulsions. Normally, agencies deal 
with this all important entity through managerial logic. Terms like capacity building, 
improving accountability, etc., are utilised for this purpose. Concepts in the Guiding 
Principles such as subsidiarity, consultation and transparency are no substitute for a serious 
analysis of the state and identifying what can and cannot be done with it. The real problem 
then is that there has been little effort made to look at the complexity surrounding the state. A 
much more nuanced understanding of the state can provide a better guidance to policy.  
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What is the Unit of Intervention or Planning? 
 
At the initial stages of humanitarian intervention, the focus was on the people who suffered 
from the event. This ranged from individuals to entire villages. During the rehabilitation 
phase, especially when projects went into areas like construction of houses, the larger social 
unit became much more relevant. The interesting question is how implementers identified 
this social unit in their planning process.  
 
Research in Aceh clearly shows the importance of this issue. Saiful Mahdi’s study, for 
example, points out the importance of gampong, or the smallest unit of communities, both for 
facing difficulties that the tsunami brought about and for rebuilding.11
 
 According to these 
findings, the social capital associated with this unit has been critical for the resilience of those 
who suffered from the tsunami. The paper contrasts this unit with what is called desa or 
keleuran , which was brought about as a result of legislation originating from Jakarta. This 
unit does not have similar resonances in Aceh. Therefore gampong is the more appropriate 
unit for planning interventions.  
The Sri Lankan equivalent of desa is the grama niladhari (GN) division, the lowest 
administrative unit. The official heading this unit is the grama niladhari. The term niladhari 
or ‘official’ denotes that he is part of the public administration. This unit was established in 
the mid fifties and by now has become an entrenched part of the public administrative 
system.12
 
 However, within a GN division or sometimes cutting across GN divisions, are other 
social units, popularly called villages.  
                                                 
11 Saiful Mahdi, in this issue. 
12 For a further discussion on this administrative unit, see Pradeep Jeganathan, in this issue. 
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During tsunami rehabilitation of Sri Lanka the grama niladhari figured prominently as a 
source of information. He or she also entered into the picture during the selection of 
beneficiaries. But the GN division did not figure that much as a unit of planning. In fact, in 
the case of Sri Lanka there seems to have been very little discussion about the unit of 
planning. On the one hand, where the pure humanitarian logic dominated, being affected by 
the tsunami was enough to make that individual or household, the unit of planning. On the 
other hand, many thought using the word ‘community’ solved the problem. However, very 
rarely was this term ‘community’ given any sociological meaning or questions posed about 
its relevance for planning.13
 
  
What is interesting is that the Guiding Principles did not provide any opening to tackle these 
types of issues. However, these types of issues have been debated in Sri Lanka in the context 
of development projects. For example, during the resettlement of people in dry zone 
settlements like Gal Oya and Mahaweli, social units within which people lived before 
resettlement became an important issue for planning resettlement. There were even 
discussions about the importance of caste in Sri Lankan villages and the need to take this into 
account in future settlements. The important issue here is not whether we agree with these 
conclusions or not, but the fact that development interventions provided spaces for these 
types of debates which could go into detail about the nature of the society that one was 
dealing with. Unfortunately, the importation of concepts that donors repeat all over the world, 
as reflected in the Guiding Principles, not only precluded such debates but also prevented 
learning from past experiences of development planners in Sri Lanka.     
 
 
                                                 
13 For a critique of the notion of ‘community’ constructed by aid agencies, see Pradeep Jeganathan, in this issue.  
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How to Deal with Land Tenure Issues? 
 
Tsunami rehabilitation soon became a large-scale housing project. Since houses have to build 
on land, projects had to deal with land tenure issues. This is not unusual for development 
projects. Development projects dealing with housing often have to tackle land tenure issues. 
In countries like Sri Lanka and Indonesia, the land tenure picture is not that simple. There can 
be several forms of it and it can change from area to area. In addition, one cannot determine 
the land tenure picture only by looking at legal documents. Field work is necessary. For 
example, the term ‘hidden tenancies’ is a common term in agrarian studies. This denotes a 
situation where the actually existing tenancy, that can be discerned by studying cultivation 
practices, is quite different from what appears on official documents.    
 
Therefore it is no surprise that the issue of identifying land became a gigantic and complex 
question for those involved in housing projects. In Sri Lanka, it got even more complicated 
by the government’s decision to implement a uniform buffer zone throughout the island.14
 
 
There is also evidence that the interest of capital, especially tourism, played a role in this 
decision.  
This experience shows that land tenure issues are a central underlying factor of housing 
projects. Questions of land tenure are always accompanied by various types of struggles and 
conflicts. For development projects that focus on housing, this is nothing new. Understanding 
land tenure patterns in the locality where projects are implemented, taking steps to sort out 
land tenure issues and leaving enough time for all this is common in development projects. 
For humanitarian organisations whose aim is restoring what existed before as soon as 
                                                 
14 For a further discussion, albeit from different angles, of some of the consequences resulting from the 
institution of this buffer zone, see papers by Malathi de Alwis and Jennifer Hyndman, in this issue. 
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possible, these issues become a problem. They do not have time to look at the complexity of 
society. Societies are seen only through the event which brought them into the picture. 
Hence, land tenure becomes a problem that somebody else has to resolve. This approach, 
which treats disasters as an event isolated from social structures, is not only incapable of 
tackling these issues, but can leave behind many problems.   
 
Land was one issue where tsunami rehabilitation could have been used to bring about 
structural reform. This was regarding people who either rented houses or illegally squatted on 
land. Due to land hunger in the densely populated coastal areas, there are settlements where 
people have occupied land illegally. These are mostly poor people who do not have capital to 
own land in these locations. It was possible to make use of rehabilitation projects to provide 
some respite to such communities.  
 
However, what dominated in tsunami rehabilitation was the notion of non-discrimination as 
stated in the Guiding Principles. This means treating those who were affected equally. In 
other words, there was no space for positive discrimination on behalf of the poor. True, the 
problem of those who lived in rented houses came up. But it was resolved through providing 
some monetary relief, rather than finding a solution of a structural nature. There is very little 
specific knowledge about how the projects dealt with those who occupied land illegally. 
 
The experience with the land issue, which was intimately linked to housing, raises a whole 
host of policy issues. Some of them have been dealt in development projects that have 
focused on housing. Hence there is a certain amount of knowledge out there that can be 
utilised. However, in order to benefit from this knowledge, rehabilitation programmes have to 
get away from the ‘emergency mode’ and preoccupation with restoring what existed before 
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as soon as possible. The usual counter argument in this regard is that these agencies are 
dealing with emergencies and cannot operate like  development projects. But if we think for a 
moment and realise that housing projects are still going on, i.e. close to four years after the 
tsunami, what we are dealing with are really development projects and not emergency 
rehabilitation. Therefore lessons that have been learnt from development projects are valid.         
 
How do you Generate an Adequate Knowledge Base of the Society in which you are 
Intervening? 
 
The issues raised above such as how do we understand the nature of the state within which 
projects operate, what is the relevant social unit for intervention and complexities of land 
tenure, raises the general question of how to generate an adequate knowledge base for 
humanitarian interventions. Some of this knowledge which gives basic data about the extent 
of damage and number of victims has to be generated anew. It also has to be done as quickly 
as possible. This part of knowledge generation seems to have been carried out quite 
satisfactorily, both in Sri Lanka and Aceh. 
 
Problems arise when we go into the rehabilitation phase. It is at this point that the type of 
issues that I have raised above come into play. It demands more in-depth understanding of 
society. At this stage there is no escape from the fact that projects have to make use of the 
existing knowledge base of societies and build on that wherever necessary. This has not been 
happening. Instead there is a dubious process of knowledge generation that can be questioned 
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at both theoretical and methodological levels.15
 
 This has also been one of the major 
complaints of the research community.  
It is from a more in-depth understanding of a society that principles that can guide 
rehabilitation programmes can be drawn. In contrast to repeating slogans that donor agencies 
market around the world, what is needed is an understanding of the specificities of the society 
where agencies are working. Humanitarian agencies and donor groups must get away from 
the temptation to use huge generalisations to understand the Global South. Concepts such as 
‘Third World’ or ‘Failed States’ simply ignore complexities within these societies and are 
intellectually sloppy. 
 
This brings me to the question about who should be responsible for generating such 
knowledge. At the very outset, let me state that this is not a question about those who are 
living in the Global South versus those who are outside. It is also not a question of white vs 
other colours. It is more a question of who is qualified and who has the experience. 
 
In my own career of working as a consultant for numerous donor funded projects, for more 
than fifteen years, I have had very different experiences of the quality of external consultants 
that I have worked with. When I began my career, mostly in development projects, most of 
my colleagues were either people who had either done their post-graduate work or some other 
form of studies, in Sri Lanka. Some others had a development studies background or were 
grounded in area studies. Many of them were aware of scholarly and political debates in Sri 
Lanka and were familiar with the academic literature on Sri Lanka. Many of them had also 
                                                 
15 For a discussion of some of these theoretical and methodological problems with reference to knowledge-
generating mechanisms such as ‘participatory rural appraisal’, see Malathi de Alwis, in this issue. For a 
discussion regarding projects focusing on gender issues and INGO responses to Islam, in Aceh, see Jacqueline 
Siapno, in this issue.  
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carried out field work in local languages. Their understanding of social science 
methodologies was also sound. 
 
There is a striking difference between these early experiences of mine and more recent ones, 
especially after ‘conflict transformation’ became a buzz word among the donors. For 
example, it is not unusual to find consultants talking and writing about conflict without using 
the word politics. If in the early period there was space for taking into account histories, 
social structures and politics of the specific societies, in a situation like a civil war where this 
understanding is essential, there are many consultants who not only do not have this 
background, but also lack training even to pick it up. Let me make it clear here, I am not 
making a sweeping generalisation, but a specific comment about individual experts. This 
means I have also had the privilege of working with individuals who know the politics of this 
country or have the necessary training to pick it up quickly. The major point I want to make 
is that this experience is much rarer now than when I worked in development projects. 
 
This personal digression was necessary to re-emphasise the point that was made                   
earlier – how global blueprints are substituting for context-based knowledge. Many of the 
consultants who go round the world work with these global blueprints. Many projects also 
work within these blueprints. In such contexts, there is no effort made to generate context-
specific knowledge or to make use of those who have an extensive expertise in the peoples 
and regions where these projects are being implemented. The result is bad projects as well as 





How to Tackle Established Structures of Power? 
 
Tsunami rehabilitation has raised many issues about its implementation process. Many of 
these complaints are about equity issues. In short, there is the usual complaint about the 
benefits being captured by influential sections of society. The other side of the coin is some 
of the tsunami affected have been left out. Some of these complaints are merely based on 
perceptions. But others have validity.  
 
These debates raise fundamental issues about the interactions between the flow of benefits 
and power structures in society. For those who would argue that disasters should be seen as 
an interaction between an event and society, the importance of this issue is self evident. 
Rather than engaging in endless debates or doing surveys to find whether these complaints 
are true or not, what we need to ask is whether project interventions have adequate tools to 
subvert power structures so that those who should benefit from the interventions actually get 
their due.    
 
In trying to deal with these issues, two concepts dominate the current                                
discussion – ‘community participation’ and the establishment of procedures for 
accountability. Both these ideas were reflected in the Guiding Principles. The first idea comes 
from development practice and the second from the discourse of good governance. However 
both might be ploys to ignore the central issue that needs to be looked at – the question of 
power structures. The notion of ‘community’ has been used for a long time to ignore the 
presence of caste, class, gender domination, ethnic discrimination, etc. Pradeep Jeganathan, 
in this issue, has critically examined the notion of ‘community’ constructed by aid agencies. 
Similarly, the notion of ‘good governance,’  addressed by Malathi de Alwis, in this issue, is 
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an attempt to develop a rule-based liberal democratic state. Once again, the issue of power 
struggles within the state are ignored. Many of the specific ideas that dominate project 
implementation can be traced to these concepts.  
 
An interesting aspect demonstrated by studies undertaken in this project is the element of self 
organisation among the tsunami-affected when they faced injustice.16
 
 This has taken various 
forms and occurred outside the development project structures. They made use of existing 
subaltern spaces in society for their protests and linked up with whoever was useful for their 
purposes; it could be political parties, religious institutions, media, etc. This is not 
participation of the community as dictated by projects, but instances of self organisation. 
They are authentic voices arising from perceived or real grievances.     
Participatory discourses of donor supported projects not only stay far away from these 
expressions of the people, but try to substitute an alternative which they can control. 
Therefore, it is never able to satisfy the needs of the community. There have been many 
writings and many criticisms of participation in academic literature.17
 
 But the very fact these 
ideas were repeated once again in the context of tsunami rehabilitation demonstrates how 
little aid policies have moved over the years. 
Participation as practiced by donor supported projects hardly leads to challenging the 
structures of power that underlie inequity in the flow of foreign aid. Once again it is a 
discourse that undermines the political action which is needed to achieve objectives of equity. 
It is time that policy debates subject the discourse of participation to a radical critique.   
 
                                                 
16 See Malathi de Alwis and Eva-Lotta Hedman, in this issue. 
17 For a discussion of this literature and various debates, see Malathi de Alwis, in this issue. 
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The Debate on Tsunami Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Conflict IDPs    
 
In both Aceh and Sri Lanka, there was a discussion, among donors and project implementing 
organizations, on whether or not to include  people affected by conflicts, in the tsunami 
assistance programmes. In both locations, pressure and in the case of Aceh, agitation, was 
necessary to make the voices of conflict IDPs heard.18
 
 Fortunately, this issue was resolved to 
a certain extent. However, the very fact this type of lobbying and pressure was necessary to 
recognise the simple fact that ignoring people affected by conflicts would lead to more 
problems says a lot about the institutional logic of humanitarian agencies.  
The Guiding Principles mention that the interventions need to be assessed for their impact on 
peace and conflict, gender, the environment, governance and human rights. Hence, conflict 
became one more thing in the laundry list that is taken round the world by donors. This is a 
formulation that never leads to any serious analysis of links between rehabilitation and the 
politics of peace.         
 
A closer look at the behaviour of aid agencies demonstrates that what determines what they 
do is their institutional logic. Although there is an elaborate mechanism to legitimise the 
activities of aid agencies on the basis of benefits to the recipient society, impact of projects, 
and various conceptual frameworks, what actually determines behaviour is the institutional 
logic of the agencies.19
                                                 
18 See Eva-Lotta Hedman, in this issue. 
 For example, if an agency identifies itself as a humanitarian 
organisation, receives funding to take care of those affected by a particular event, and has an 
internal logic to operate on this basis, this is what will prevail irrespective of how this 
approach will impact on the recipient society.  
19 For a very useful contextualization and historicization of the institutional logic of Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA), see Jennifer Hyndman, in this issue. 
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Many agencies will argue that this is a result of the specialisation of various agencies and this 
is necessary for them to be effective. But the problem arises when there is a contradiction 
between this specialisation of the organisation and resulting institutional logic and the 
demands of societies in which these agencies begin to operate. Although there have been 
discussions about adaptable organisational structures, and even building organisations based 
on chaos theory which is more suitable for dealing with complexities of societies, very little 
progress has been made on this front. In the complex world in which aid agencies work, such 
institutional adaptations are essential. 
